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THE HISTORY OF ESTATE PLANNING
William D. Rollison*
There is no part of the law of greater interest to the people of America
and England, from the standpoint of numbers, than estate planning. This
interest is not something that is new; it goes back to the days of a feudal society
in England shortly after the Norman Conquest. It is my purpose to give a
survey of the historical development of the subject.
I.
Estate planning is a process that is not subject to precise delimitation,
owing to the innumerable factors which must be considered. As a process it
involves the use and arrangement of property for and among the members of
the owner's family group according to a design that will afford the greatest
benefit to the objects of the owner's bounty commensurate with estate conser-
vation.' But this is only a part of the process. While the basic steps are fairly
well defined, the ramifications and combinations are only limited by the ability
of the deft planner, acting consistently with the law and the wishes of the prop-
erty owner. Accordingly, estate planning is not, in modem law, a job for the
amateur or the general practicioner - it is a task for the expert. It involves
a wide range of knowledge and the ability to use it. Even the expert may have
difficulty in preparing the instruments for a complicated estate plan. No one
can deny that an adequate understanding of the historical development gives
a better understanding of modem law in estate planning.
While a will is not the only form of an estate plan, it is the type most
generally used, either singly or in conjunction with other types of plans. The
will is the only written form whose main function is the posthumous disposition
of property. However, as a testamentary instrument it has other functions
besides the posthumous disposition of property, such as the naming of a fiduciary
to administer the testator's estate, suggesting a guardian, republishing prior
testamentary instruments, or revoking prior testamentary instruments.
The will appears to be the earliest of all estate plans. Professor Page says
that there is evidence of its use in Egypt some thirty centuries before the time
of Christ.2 The nearest thing to the modem will had its genesis in the Roman
Law. The will in Roman Law was revocable, and the legislation of Justinian
provided formal requisites.3 Wills appear to have been in use in England,
especially among notables, prior to the Norman Conquest. But wills received
their greatest legal development in modem law in England after the Norman
Conquest; and this is the real genesis of the will as used today. The history of
the modem will is closely related to the history and development of the use
(the forerunner of the trust) and to the history of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
No scholar can doubt the interrelation of these three subjects both from the
A.B., LL.B., LL.M.; Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; member of Indiana
and Alabama Bars.
1 See SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK, 3 (2d ed. 1953).
2 1 PAGE, WILLS § 2.4 (3rd ed. Bowe & Parker 1960).
3 See PAGE, op. Cit. supra note 2, § 2.5.
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practical standpoint, and from that of historical development. Nowhere else
in the law do any three subjects have such unity of development or unity of
purpose. And this is the way in which these subjects should be handled in our
law schools.4
One resorts to estate planning for some purpose or purposes to be found
in the legal and social order of the time. The Norman Conquest occasioned
great changes in the legal and social order in England. Regardless of whether
feudalism was introduced into England after the Conquest, or whether an exist-
ing feudal system was expanded after the Conquest, it is apparent that feudalism
received its greatest development in England after the Conquest, with great
impact upon the history of estate planning in Anglo-American law. The will
(devise) .and the testament were forced into separate legal channels and the
law was developed by separate courts. The ecclesiastical courts developed the
law pertaining to testaments, and our probate law owes its origin to these courts.
The law pertaining to devises was developed by the temporal courts. It was
not until 1837 that unification of the formal requisites for devises and testa-
ments took place in England. On the procedural side, unification took place
in 1857, under the Court of Probate Act in England.' This separate develop-
ment of devises and testaments left its impact on American law in some areas
until well into the twentieth century.
The law of wills has had a rather checkered existence. The legal and social
order produced by feudalism occasioned general abolition of the devise in Eng-
land by the end of the twelfth century.' Thus, for a while, testamentary power
over land ceased to exist in most areas. Various reasons have been assigned for
this development: (1) The superior lord's" valuable rights of relief, wardship,
and marriage in the feudal system- a kind of taxation, called by some an
extortion of benefits from tenants. A power to devise land could have defeated
these benefits. (2) The incidents of land tenure. The doctrine of seisin was
paramount at the time. Land could be transferred only by livery of seisin or
by proceedings in a court of record. The devise could not be classified under
either method, and so it could not be recognized.7 Also, a dead man (the
testator, in this respect) could not make livery of seisin; and the devisee, when
the time came to enter, was confronted by the heir, from whom he had to
obtain livery of seisin, the result probably being a refusal.8 (3) The fear of
undue influence by religious men in the last hours of the testator's life. It is
difficult to find any evidence of the truth of this view. It assumes that devises
were made by persons in extremis. One can only wonder about this suggestion
because of the ancient superstition that a person who makes a will may die soon
thereafter.
4 Rollison, The Course in Estate Planning at Notre Dame, 36 NoamE DAME LAWYER
315 (1961).
5 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77 (1857).
6 See PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2.9; ROLLISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ESTATE
PLANNING 89-91 (1959).
7 See PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2.9.
8 ROLLISON, WILLS 85 (1939); UNDERHILL, WILLS & (2d ed. 1906).
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II.
Notwithstanding the difficulties listed above and the demise of the devise,
the people in England were not to be denied estate planning. We have ample
evidence of the desire of property owners to plan their estates, from the words
of the great English judges, who have told us that most of the land in England
was held in use, and land was the chief item of wealth. Personal property
was of relatively little value. This was the situation about the time of the
demise of the devise.
Why was the use so important? The Preamble to the Statute of Uses indi-
cates the answers. As far as estate planning is concerned they are: (1) the
desire of landowners to dispose of their estates other than in accordance with
the law of descent; (2) a desire to evade the feudal exactions; and (3) a
desire to exclude dower and curtesy.
With the vanishing of testamentary power over land in most areas, the
use gave an opportunity to effectuate the desires of the property owner in estate
planning. If the use was properly created, the equitable owner (cestui) could
dispose of it by will, enforceable by the chancellors. The use was an equitable
interest, not subject to the incidents of seisin. This sort of an estate plan was
quite common by the early part of the fifteenth century.9 In it we have the
origin of the power of appointment.
When land was held in use the cestui que use was enabled to evade or
avoid many of the exactions of the feudal overlord."0 The Preamble to the
Statute of Ues states that by reason of holding land to use "lords have lost
their wards, marriages, reliefs, harriots, escheats, . . ." - valuable feudal exac-
tions.
The Preamble also states that by means of the use "men married have
lost their tenancies by curtesy, women their dower." There is little evidence
beyond this statement to support this conclusion, if it refers to a use being
created to exclude dower or curtesy. On the other hand, at the time of enact-
ment of the Statute of Uses there was no dower or curtesy in a use (an equitable
interest). So from this standpoint the statement is correct. Even if the use
was created to exclude dower or curtesy, it seems to be reasonably clear that
such a purpose in estate planning was not nearly as significant as other purposes.
Thus, testamentary power over land staged a comeback; but not for long.
The Statute of Uses checked for a time the creation of uses; and it destroyed
testamentary power over uses by executing existing uses, as well as future uses.
The provisions of this Statute were of deep concern to the people. The demand
for testamentary power was too strong for Parliament to resist, and this power
was restored to a great extent by the Statute of Wills in 1540, and more com-
pletely, indirectly, by the enactment of the Statute of Military Tenures in 1660.
The latter statute abolished all feudal tenures, except in certain localities, and
thus made all lands devisable where applicable."'
9 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 420 et seq. (3rd ed. 1945).
10 NORTHRUP, REAL PROPERTY 289 (1919).
11 REPPY & TOMPKINS, HISTORY OF WILLS 27 (1928).
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III.
Other developments were taking place. With the passing of feudalism
from the legal scene, exceptions to the Statute of Uses were recognized. As
construed, three exceptions were recognized: (1) A use on a use. The second
use was considered valid, though dry or passive. (2) Where a leasehold, or
personal property, was limited to a use. (The Statute did not apply to personal
.property). (3) The active use. 2 The modem trust emerged from these excep-
tions. This does not mean that the term "use" passed from the legal scene. It
has a place of considerable importance in the drafting of modem trusts.
The Statute of Uses has either been re-enacted or is recognized as part of
the common law in most jurisdictions in the United States. 3 Thus, the distinc-
tion between active and passive trusts is a significant part of estate planning.
There is a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the Statute, where applic-
able, applies to trusts of personal property."4 The doctrine that a use on a use
is not executed by the Statute has received some recognition in early American
cases.1
5
Modem legislation as to wills has its roots in the Statute of Wills (1540)
in England. This statute merely restored testamentary power over land, with
certain restrictions as to scope of operation over tenure, without requiring any
formalities in the execution of a will other than a "writing." Its scope of
operation was enlarged by the Statute of Military Tenures.
The next important legislation concerning wills was the Statute of Frauds
(1676), requiring "all devises and bequests of any lands or tenements" to be
in writing and signed by the testator, or some other person in the testator's
presence and by his express direction, and be attested and subscribed by three
or four credible witnesses. This statute contained the first legislative restrictions
on the revocation of wills. It regulated the execution of the oral will of personal
property where the amount involved exceeded thirty pounds. It accorded the
first legislative favoritism to wills of servicemen by exempting them from the
provisions as to execution. Section 7 of this statute required trusts of land to
be "manifested and proved" by some writing signed by the party who was
entitled by law to declare the trust, or by his will in writing. Similar statutes
exist in most jurisdictions in the United States, though American statutes differ
in some detail from the English statute. Section 8 of the English statute exempts
from the operation of Section 7 trusts which "arise or result by implication or
construction of law." This exemption has been adopted generally in the United
States.
The Statute of 25 George II (1752), qualified beneficiaries and creditors
of the testator-as" witnesses to his will. The beneficiary-witness was qualified by
losing his benefits from the will. The creditor was rendered competent, but his
credit was left to be considered under all of the circumstances by the court and
jury before whom the will should be contested.
The next important legislation in England was the Wills Act (1837),
12 See ROLLISON, CASES AND -MATERIALS ON ESTATE PLANNING 67-68 (1959).
13 BOGERT, TRUSTS 202 (3rd ed. 1952).
14 ROLLISON, op. cit. supra note 12 at 69.
15 Id. at 70.
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regulating the execution and revocation of wills and testaments. It made the
substantive law uniform for both wills and testaments for the first time. It
reduced the number of witnesses necessary to the execution of a will from
"three or four" to two, and required a will to be signed at "the foot or end
thereof." It also exempted wills of servicemen from its formal requirements.
It repealed the Statute of 25 George II, although it re-enacted some of its
provisions. An important provision permitted a will to pass after-acquired
realty. A constructional provision, often overlooked, states that a limitation
over, upon death without issue, means a definite failure of issue, in the absence
of any indication in the instrument in question to the contrary.
The beginning of American legislation dealing with the substantive law
of wills is to be found in these English statutes; and these statutes have had
their impact on the very latest legislation, including the Model Probate Code.
Two other types of estate plans, used only to dispose of property after
death of the owner, are the gift causa mortis and the contract to devise or
bequeath property. These appear to have reached their first extensive recognition
in eighteenth-century cases.16
There seems to have been little, if any, doubt about validity and enforce-
ment of a contract to devise or bequeath property. Conflict has existed and
does exists as to the methods of enforcement.
Some two or three centuries before the Norman Conquest, and for about
a century thereafter, instruments were used in England to make a posthumous
disposition of property, and they were so drafted that they have been considered
by some to be gifts causa mortis rather than wills or testaments. But the gift
causa mortis, as it was developed at the common law, derived from the Roman
or civil law.1" Sanction was not without some misgivings as to the use of such
transfers to evade the stringent requirements of the Statute of Frauds governing
nuncupative testaments.'9 The requirement of delivery appears to have been
sufficient to distinguish the gift causa mortis from a legacy,2" and to sustain
validity of the gift notwithstanding the requirements of the Statute of Frauds
as to nuncupative testaments. The Roman or civil law recognized a limitation
as to the amount of the donor's property which might be given causa mortis.2
Some early American cases held that the donor could not make a gift causa
16 BOGERT, TRUSTS 82 (2d ed. 1942).
17 Gift causa mortis: Tate v. Gilbert, 2 Ves. Jun. 111, 30 Eng. Rep. 548 (1793);
Blount v. Burrow, 1 Ves. Jun. 564, 30 Eng. Rep. 481 (1792); Hill v. Chapman, 2 Bro.
C. C. 612, 29 Eng. Rep. 337 (1789); Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 28 Eng. Rep. 275
(1752); Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk. 214, 26 Eng. Rep. 924 (1744); Miller v. Miller, 3 Pm.
Wins. 356, 24 Eng. Rep. 1099 (1735); Lawson v. Lawson, 1 Pm. Wms. 441, 24 Eng. Rep.
463 (1718); Drury v. Smith, 1 Pm. Wms. 404, 24 Eng. Rep. 446 (1717); Jones v. Selby,
Prec. Ch. 300, 24 Eng. Rep. 143 (1710).
Contract to devise or bequeath: Walpole v. Oxford, 3 Ves. Jun. 402, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076
(1797); Jones v. Martin, 3 Anst. 882, 145 Eng. Rep. 1070 (1798). As early as 1682 a con-
tract to devise land was enforced in chancery without any question: Goilmere v. Battison,
1 Vern. 49, 23 Eng. Rep. 300 (1682).
18 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1658.
19 Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 28 Eng. Rep. 275 (1752).
20 Ward v. Turner, supra note 19, Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swans. 92, 36 Eng. Rep. 549
(1818).
21 Ward v. Turner, supra note 19.
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mortis of all his personal property; but these have either been overruled or
not followed.22 An ordinance of Justinian provided that if a gift causa mortis
was made, regardless of whether it was in writing, in the presence of five wit-
nesses (the number necessary for a codicil), registration and the usual notarial
formalities were unnecessary." The common law authorities do not require a
plurality of witnesses to establish a gift causa mortis, but only that the proof be
satisfactory.24
IV.
The various types of estates in property have played an important role in
estate planning, from the standpoint of purposes and historical development.
The incidents of estates are important factors in estate planning, although in
altogether too many instances this has not been emphasized by draftsmen. It
was the operational incidents of certain estates that led to the development of
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Man's desire to project himself posthumously into the future and to con-
trol the ultimate destination of his property and the destinies of his family
or donees often manifests itself. This attempt at posthumous control took, and
takes, two forms: (1) an attempt to restrain alienation; and (2) the creation
of limitations to take effect in the future.
An early method of tying up estates in families was use of the estate tail.
This involved an attempt to confine the inheritance to a particular class of
heirs. The purpose here seems to have been to create an estate that would be
inheritable by the particular heirs and which could not be transferred so as to
deprive subsequent heirs of their inheritance. The courts favored freedom of
alienation, as a matter of public policy. For instance, a conveyance to "A and
the heirs of his body" was regarded as passing a fee on condition of A having
heirs of his body, and when A had heirs he performed the condition and this
enabled him to transfer an estate in fee; such a transfer cut off the claims of
A's heirs of his body. This displeased the landowners, and they procured the
enactment of the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus (1285), making estates
tail inalienable, depriving A, in the instance given above, of the power to bar
his descendants.
The Statute De Donis Conditionalibus was said to have established a
"general perpetuity" and to be the "occasion and cause of .. .mischiefs. And
the same was attempted and endeavoured to be remedied at divers Parliaments
and divers bills were exhibited accordingly .. . but they were always on one
pretence or other rejected." 25 About two hundred years after enactment of this
statute, it was held in Taltarum's Case" that an estate tail might be docked
and barred by a common recovery. This sort of procedure was discussed in
Mildmay's Case in 1605,27 wherein it is said that "mischiefs" arose after the
change of the common law by the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, which
were not foreseen by those who made the change, and that the common recovery
22 Annot., 90 A.L.R. 366 (1934); LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 149 (4th ed. 1956).
23 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1675; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 366 (1934).
24 LEE, op. cit. supra note 21.
25 Walter v. Hodge, Supra note 20.
26 Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 40b, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 313 (1605).
27 Y. B. 12 Edw. IV, pl. 25, F. 19 (1473).
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was not within the restraint of the perpetuity made by the Statute. Regardless
of such "mischiefs," the policy of the courts favoring freedom of alienation was
manifested again; and again landowners were displeased and made efforts to
avoid the effect of the decision in Taltarum's Case. One method was to attach
a condition against alienation on the creation of an estate tail; but the condition
was held to be repugnant to the estate tail and against the law. 8 A later method
of docking or barring an estate tail was the fine."9 The condition against
alienation probably was aimed at both the common recovery and the fine.
The attempt to create an unbarrable estate tail appears to be the first transaction
to which the term "perpetuity" was attached. Even in the Duke of Norfolk's
Case3" it is said that:
A perpetuity is the settlement of an estate or interest in, tail, with
such remainders expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power
of the tenant in tail in possession, to dock by any recovery or
assignment, but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs
upon the estate....
Other attempts were made by landowners to create lasting settlements of
their estates, notwithstanding the judicial policy against restraints on alienation.
One was to create a perpetual freehold by limiting successive estates for life to
the heirs or unborn issue of a person ad infinitum; this failed. 1 Another device
was creation of a species of estate tail by means of an executory bequest of a
term of years to a person and his heirs one after another ad infinitum, either
directly or in trust; this also failed. It would have created a "perpetuity" if the
limitation had been held to be legal, because it could not be barred by the
common recovery or fine as these did not apply to estates for years. 2
The Rule in Shelley's Case had to be reckoned with, and it still has to be,
even under legislation purporting to abolish it. The actual origin of this Rule
is veiled in some obscurity." As applied, it facilitates the alienation of property,
by uniting the remainder and the life estate in the life tenant. Where operative,
an attempt to create a remainder in the heirs of the life tenant is fruitless.
Future estates are either vested or contingent. Remainders are not only
either vested or contingent, but they may be cross or alternative. Contingent
remainders appear to have been adjudged valid as early as 1430, but they were
seldom employed until the latter half of the following century. 4 This, of course,
was some time after enactment of the Statute of Wills and the Statute of Uses.
Failure to use the contingent remainder to any extent may have been due to
the destructibility rule. It seems to be clear that the destructibility rule would
have eliminated reliance upon the judicial policy favoring freedom of alienation.
And in modem law, where the destructibility rule is applicable, there would
seem to be no occasion to rely upon the Rule Against Perpetuities to preserve
freedom of alienation, or as a rule against remoteness of vesting. However, this
is not so in jurisdictions where the destructibility rule is abolished.
28 Mildmay's Case, supra note 26.
29 NORTHRUP, REAL PROPERTY 43 (1919).
30 3 Ch. Gas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1602).
31 1 JARMAN, WILLS 290 (8th ed. 1951).
32 JARMAN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 291.
33 See Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A. C. 658.
34 SPITZ, CONDITIONAL AND FUTURE INTERESTS IN PROPERTY 194 (1912).
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At the early common law a fee could not be limited on a fee.3" Future
estates could create by remainder and by way of reversion. Other types of
future interests came to be recognized and some were, in effect, the result of
the Statute of Uses. A use could be created, unlike reversions and remainders,
without dependence upon any prior estate; or a use could be created as a
remainder after a particular estate."6 A use could be made to spring up at a
designated future time, or made to shift on a future event happening. Uses
were not dependent upon the common law notion as to seisin. If a use was
limited in fee, then an equitable fee could be made to shift or to spring up in
the future. After enactment of the Statute of Uses, springing or shifting uses
were executed when they arose or the contingency occurred, and thus new
estates were recognized at law. After enactment of the Statute of Wills such
future interests could be created by a will in land, and when so created they
were known as executory devises or limitations. Accordingly, contingent future
interests other than remainders became possible and claimed the attention of
the courts.
At about the time these developments were taking place another was
becoming important.. A term for years was not uncommon; but terms appear
to have been short and to be regarded as chattels."7 There appear to be few,
if any attempts to limit a future interest of a term prior to the enactment of
the Statute of Wills. We have already noticed the judicial policy against
restraints on alienation and the effect of the feudalistic system on the devise.
The Statute of Wills offered an opportunity to landowners, with the aid of the
construction placed upon the Statute of Uses as applying only to land (realty),
to carry out their desires to create lasting settlements by use of the term. Thus,
executory limitations of terms became more common; terms became longer;
and the courts sustained validity of the executory limitation of a term.3" An
executory limitation of a term was declared to be indestructible by the act of
the prior taker.3" A little later it was held that an executory limitation of a
shifting fee, created by will on a prior fee that was devised, was not destructible
by a common recovery suffered by the first taker in fee."0 This emancipation
of the executory devise from the destructibility doctrine presented a challenge
to'the judicial policy favoring freedom of alienation. It was an important factor
leading to the rule confining executory limitations within reasonable time limits,
which rule began to take form in the Duke of Norfolk's Case,4 ' and later became
known as the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Whether the Rule Against Perpetuities, as finally developed, is aimed at
restraints on alienation or at remoteness of vesting of limitations over, is a
battleground of jurisprudence. Be that as it may, the Rule is important in
estate planning. It has a close connection with wills, trusts, and the creation of
35 NORTHRUP, REAL PROPERTY 288 (1919).
36 NoR.THRUP, Op. cit. supra note 35, at 288.
37 R OLLISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ESTATE PLANNING 599 (1959).
38 Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (1609) (term of 50 years);
Lampet's Case (1612) 19 Co. Rep. 46a, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612) (term of 5,000 years).
39 Manning's Case, supra note 38.
40 Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
41 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
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future interests in property. It tends to emphasize the importance of estates
in estate planning. The practical aspects or incidents of various estates or
interests in property, such as creation, transferability, and in modem jargon,
liquidity, cannot be overemphasized. Altogether too often this is overlooked.
V.
Thus, estate planning, due to its very nature and functions, cannot be
said to be a modem process. By examination of the origins of this process, it
can be seen that in the early English law, the same reasons existed for resorting
to this process as presently exist in modern law. The name is new; it may have
come into general usage after enactment of the 1948 Internal Revenue Code -
a Code that has given a new turn to estate planning. It gives us new devices
in estate planning, such as the split gift and the marital deduction gift. It gives
greater significance to the life estate with the power of appointment. New
terms, either from provisions of this Code or in construction of it, have received
common usage, such as the short-term trust, the pour-over trust, the sprinkling
trust, and the terminable interest. Gifts have been given a new status and
classification. Modem inheritance tax statutes do not go so far, but they are
a factor to be considered in many cases.
There is no doubt but that the Internal Revenue Code has given a great
impetus to estate planning. While developments in taxation have stimulated
interest in estate planning, it is erroneous to identify estate planning only with
tax savings or tax reduction. Much estate planning takes place without regard
to estate or inheritance tax incidents as factors.
Estate and inheritance taxation has created new interest in life insurance.
Life insurance should be considered from the standpoints of the gift tax, the
estate tax, and inheritance taxes. It may be used to provide liquid funds, as in
key-man insurance, and in connection with the disposition of a business interest.
There are other incidents in estate planning connected with life insurance.
Newer phases are social security and pension plans. The question as to whether
life insurance options qualify for the marital deduction is one of great moment.
In addition to taxation, there are many more recent developments in estate
planning. The law of corporations and the law of partnerships have taken on
new significance. The modem importance of the family, or close, corporation
is unparalleled by anything in history in this field. This sort of enterprise raises
problems concerning the impact of taxation, reorganization, and future control
over the busines involved, as well as key-man insurance. Other problems in-
general corporation law are of specific concern to the estate planner, such as
voting rights, subscription rights, disposal of stock dividends, and the modern
stock-split.
In the law of partnerships we deal more and more with key-man insur-
ance, and we find the partnership contract taking on the character of an estate
plan as shown by agreements admitting new members on the death of a partner
and the disposal of the interest of a deceased partner.
Deeds and contracts have taken on new significance. The revocable deed
is attaining legal sanction on its own, apart from the law of wills, and notwith-
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standing the doctrine of inconsistency.42 We find many modem estate plans
in the form of a deed and simultaneous declaration of trust by the grantee.
Antenuptial and postnuptial contracts, as estate plans, are fairly common. Also,
there are contracts to make or not to revoke wills and the contract-will com-
bination. The latter is useful in controlling the ultimate destination of jointly
owned property. Indiana and Missouri lead the way in sanctioning and giving
operative effect to this sort of an estate plan. In this connection, it is hard to
find any good reason for having to rely upon the doctrine of estoppel, or giving
overemphasis to the ambulatory character of wills. Contractual waiver of one
spouse to take against the will of the other is not uncommon. Sometimes adop-
tion proceedings fail to comply with the controlling statute. In such cases, if
a contract to adopt can be established, it may assure the child concerned his
or her share in the estate of the would-be foster parent.
The common law in England did not recognize adoption,43 and the first
legislation on this subject in England was passed in 1926."4 An illegitimate
child who had been begotten before his parent's marriage was proclaimed legiti-
mate if his parents married before his birth. Legislative provision for adoption
exists in every state. Legislation providing for legitimation exists in most states.
The first legislation in England designed to prevent lapse of testamentary gifts
was contained in the Wills Act (1837). In most states there is legislation similar
to this provision of the Wills Act. Most of the state legislation is a product of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, though in a few areas statutes appeared
in the latter part of the eighteenth century in the United States.
Legislation dealing with pretermission of heirs has been enacted in most
of the United States. This is a manifestation of disapproval of the English
view of freedom of testation as to issue. Heirs have received some statutory
protection against disinheritance in a few states by statutes limiting the amount
that can be given by will to charity in case the testator is survived by certain
relatives.
VI.
General overhauling of probate law took place in Indiana in 1953, and
in Missouri and Texas in 1955. The Model Probate Code received greater
recognition in the new Indiana Code than in the new codes in Texas and
Missouri. Several states within the last fifty years have made extensive changes
in segments of probate law. Twice within the last three years New York has
amended its law pertaining to restraints on alienation, bringing its present rule
practically into line with the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. The Uni-
form Simultaneous Death Act, approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association in 1940, is of
considerable significance in estate planning, especially since the pace of modem
living with its multiple forms of transportation, including the jet airplane, has
caused simultaneous deaths in families to occur with greater frequency than
in the past. The Act has been adopted in forty-six states.
42 See St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo 207, 260 S.W.2d 483 (1953); ROLLISON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ESTATE PLANNING 783 (1959).
43 See Humphrys v. Polak (1901) L.R. 2 K.B. 385.
44 ATKINSON, WILLS 39 (1937).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Several other Uniform Acts and some Model Acts, all in the area of estate
planning, have been approved within recent years by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association. The
Model Execution of Wills Act, approved in 1940, has been adopted in Ten-
nessee. This Act supersedes the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, of 1910,
which had been adopted in thirteen jurisdictions. This Act, as far as the execu-
tion of wills is concerned, is superseded by the Model Probate Code. The
Model Spendthrift Trust Act, prepared by Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard
Law School, has been adopted in Louisiana and Oklahoma. The Model Rule
Against Perpetuities Act, approved in 1944, has been adopted in California,
Montana and Wyoming. The purpose of this Act is to effectuate the common
law rule. The Model Act Concerning the Administration of Charitable Trusts,
Devises and Bequests, approved in 1944, has been adopted in Alabama, Mary-
land and Vermont. The substantive part of this Act is in one paragraph, con-
sisting of a statement of the application of the cy pres doctrine.
The Uniform Adoption Act, approved in 1953, has been adopted in
Montana and Oklahoma. This act deals solely with adoption procedure,
which, of course, is only a part of the significance of adoption. If the procedure
fails, the child involved may still have the right to share in the property of the
person seeking to adopt him, provided a contract to adopt can be established.
There are many ramifications of adoption in the law of descent and distribu-
tion45 and in the construction of the term "child," or the term "children," in
wills. The Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act, approved in 1949,
has been adopted in Wisconsin. The utility of this Act far exceeds the unfavor-
able implication which is raised by reason of its limited adoption. The Uniform
Common Trust Fund Act, approved in 1938, has been adopted in twenty-eight
states. This Act does not cover in detail all of the restrictions on the operation
of common trust funds; detailed restrictions are covered by the regulations issued
by the Federal Reserve Board which became effective in 1937.46 The Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, approved in 1922, has been adopted in twenty-one states and the
District of Columbia. It deals with situations which arise when one person
deals with another whom he knows to be a fiduciary, and it also established uni-
form and definite rules as to constructive notice of breaches of fiduciary obliga-
tions. The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, approved in 1956, has been adopted
in forty-one states. It sets forth a form for the making of such gifts. By its
terms the transfer is made to a custodian whose duties and powers are prescribed.
The Act enlarges the significance of this new type of official in estate planning.
Compliance with the provisions of this Act is of special significance in con-
nection with the Internal Revenue Code.4 7 The Uniform Principal and Income
Act, approved in 1931, has been adopted in twenty-three states. Its purpose is
to deal with the difficult problems of adjustment of principal and income
between tenants and remaindermen in trust and other estates in property.48
45 See Note, 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 451 (1956); Model Probate Code §§ 5, 27, 28(Simes 1946).
46 See 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 224.
47 See Commissioners' Prefatory note to the Act.
48 See Commissioners' Prefatory note to the Act.
THE HISTORY OF ESTATE PLANNING
The Uniform Probate of Foreign Wills Act, approved in 1950, has been adopted
in Texas and Wisconsin. Probably the existence of legislation in most states
dealing with one or more of the principal problems concerning foreign wills
accounts for the extent of adoption. The Uniform Property Act, approved in
1938, has been adopted in Nebraska. It deals with a variety of matters, many
of which are of interest to estate planners, such as the Rule in Shelley's Case,
the Rule in Wild's Case, the doctrine of the Worthier Title, an inter vivos
transfer to the heirs of the grantor, indestructibility of contingent interests, crea-
tion of cross-remainders, estates tail, and it also contains a constructional pro-
vision governing failure of issue, when these terms are used in a limitation.
Besides the Uniform and Model Acts, in estate planning one must also
reckon with the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, now in the second edition,
and the Restatement of the Law of Property.
In England a part of the law of trusts has been codified in the Trustee
Act and the Charitable Trusts Act. In the United States several states have
enacted trust codes of considerable detail. Notwithstanding such codes, and
the many Uniform and Model Acts, a great part of trust law is still case law.
This" plethora of legislative activity does serve, however, to bear witness to the
significance of estate planning and its many ramifications in modem law.
All of these matters lead to one conclusion: Estate planning, in our time,
is one of the most complex as well as one of the most interesting tasks of the
practicing lawyer. It requires a wide range of knowledge, probably more so
that any other part of the practice of law. From the historical standpoint estate
planning has had its most intense and greatest development in our time. The
significance of this subject is being emphasized by the large number of damage
suits brought against attorneys for improperly drafted estate plans and for the
careless handling of matters of estate administration. The estate planner must
not only have a wide range of knowledge; he must also be able to apply this
knowledge when he plans an estate. Due to the increasing legislative activity
and number of cases, the estate planner must keep his knowledge current. In
the well drafted estate plan there is no place for brevity, the use of elastic terms,
lack of clarity, or lack of knowledge. The client is entitled to expect the utmost
competence on the part of the attorney in preparing his estate plan.
